Animals form groups for many reasons but there are costs and benefit associated with group formation. One of the benefits is collective memory. In groups on the move, social interactions play a crucial role in the cohesion and the ability to make consensus decisions. When migrating from spawning to feeding areas fish schools need to retain a collective memory of the destination site over thousand of kilometers and changes in group formation or individual preference can produce sudden changes in migration pathways. We propose a modelling framework, based on stochastic adaptive networks, that can reproduce this collective behaviour. We assume that three factors control group formation and school migration behaviour: the intensity of social interaction, the relative number of informed individuals and the preference that each individual has for the particular migration area. We treat these factors independently and relate the individuals' preferences to the experience and memory for certain migration sites. We demonstrate that removal of knowledgable individuals or alteration of individual preference can produce rapid changes in group formation and collective behavior. For example, intensive fishing targeting the migratory species and also their preferred prey can reduce both terms to a point at which migration to the destination sites is suddenly stopped. The conceptual approaches represented by our modelling framework may therefore be able to explain large-scale changes in fish migration and spatial distribution.
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Abstract Animals form groups for many reasons but there are costs and benefit associated with group formation. One of the benefits is collective memory. In groups on the move, social interactions play a crucial role in the cohesion and the ability to make consensus decisions. When migrating from spawning to feeding areas fish schools need to retain a collective memory of the destination site over thousand of kilometers and changes in group formation or individual preference can produce sudden changes in migration pathways. We propose a modelling framework, based on stochastic adaptive networks, that can reproduce this collective behaviour. We assume that three factors control group formation and school migration behaviour: the intensity of social interaction, the relative number of informed individuals and the preference that each individual has for the particular migration area. We treat these factors independently and relate the individuals' preferences to the experience and memory for certain migration sites. We demonstrate that removal of knowledgable individuals or alteration of individual preference can produce rapid changes in group formation and collective behavior. For example, intensive fishing targeting the migratory species and also their preferred prey can reduce both terms to a point at which migration to the destination sites is suddenly stopped. The conceptual approaches represented by our modelling framework may therefore be able to explain large-scale changes in fish migration and spatial distribution.
Introduction
Grouping behavior is a widespread phenomenon in animal ecology and is thought to be an emerging property of the self-organization of individual organisms [1] . While living in groups, social animals benefit from several advantages among which is a more efficient capacity in problem solving [2, 3, 4] . Of particular interest is the ability of the group to make collective decisions also when it is composed of individuals with contrasting preferences and information [5, 6] . How groups reach a consensus decision has recently received much attention [7, 8, 9, 10] and several mechanisms to pool information in the group have been proposed [6, 1] .
Often no obvious reason can be adduced to explain the social behavior of certain species except the fact that those groups are more efficient than single individuals in retrieving information from the environment [11, 9, 12] . For groups on the move, such as fish schooling, bird flocking or mammal herding, it has been shown that information transfer and social interactions are important factors of group cohesion and can promote the ability of making consensus decisions [13, 14, 10] .
An example of such a collective decision making problem is the structure of migration routes in some fish species. Migration between widely separated but geographically stable locations of spawning and feeding sites raises several questions about how these animals manage to learn and remember the migration route between feeding and spawning sites. Where is the information on the path stored? How is it retrieved, shared and elaborated by a migrating group? Are these tasks performed significantly better by the group with respect to the individuals? Shedding light on the functioning of these mechanisms is a fundamental issue in ecology but may also be relevant to fields such as sociology and economy where it is common to deal with large systems of competitive agents that share information [11, 4] . We hypothesize that collective memory might play an important role in the migration process of fish populations [13] and model its effects on schooling behavior and migration efficiency. Moreover we verify our model predictions against the hypothesis that the breakdown of socially transmitted traditions might drive changes in habitat distribution and stock collapses in several fish species [15] . We tackle these questions by assuming that individuals have different amounts of information about migration routes and that only a fraction of them possesses some information, whereas the other fraction only exhibit a social behaviour. Those assumptions are consistent with numerical simulations of the evolution of leader and social traits in migratory populations [16, 17] but are introduced in our model in a differ-ent way. In fact previous approaches mainly fall in a class of agent based models with spatial interaction [18, 19, 1, 20, 16] where "social" individuals tend to align and to follow the individuals that are nearby, in a finite spatial range. This reproduces a somewhat realistic dynamics, providing insights that go much beyond simple dynamics models that assume a well mixed population of individuals. Still, spatial dynamics models are very complex and they can only be studied with extensive numerical simulations, giving little insight on the mechanisms by which the collective behaviour emerges from individual interactions.
Here we take a different approach which retains the interplay between social interaction and information dynamics and allows us to collapse the spatial dimension into a complex dynamical network structure (Figure 1 ). Capitalizing on previous models [21, 22] we extend the approach by adding the key ingredient of memory and information in the group. Information here may refer to the choice of the route direction, which in the model is expressed as a function of individual and social processes. In addition, the model accounts for the possibility that individuals might have an a priori bias for a particular choice, akin to a form of partial information based on their experience in that particular habitat: their memory. We are able to find an exact solution for the model that provides a clear picture of how information is elaborated, stored and shared in the group and allows us to describe an observed switch of migratory path in fish populations as a result of a loss of group level information. 
Theoretical framework
Most studies about swarming phenomena in animal groups have relied on real space dynamical models [1] . Here, we address the issue of group formation using a network dynamical model [21, 22] , where each individual is represented by a node in a graph. While space is not explicitly resolved we assume that neighbouring individuals are represented by neighbouring nodes in the graph (Figure 1) .
We assume that each node i has an internal dynamical variable a i that can take integer values ranging from 1 to q. A state of the system is defined by the adjacency matrix of the system g ij (g ij = 1 if individual i and individual j are linked 0 otherwise) and by the set of the internal dynamical states variables a i . The evolution of the system is governed by stochastic dynamics in which both the neighbourhood and the values of the internal dynamical state may vary.
In particular, the choice of the destination a i is influenced by two factors: i) pro-social behaviour, by which an individual keeps the same destination of their neighbours and ii) memory, by which an isolated individual preferentially heads toward a destination α i that is encoded in its memory. The first effect is quantified by the rate η at which individuals form new links with other individuals, provided they are heading towards the same destination. This parameter encodes both evolutionarily selected traits for pro-social behaviour and environmental factors, notably the average distance between individuals. Memory, instead, is quantified by the strength h α i with which isolated individuals adopt their preferred choice α i . This set-up naturally encodes the constraint that only individuals moving in the same direction can possibly form links, as individuals moving towards different destinations will unlikely be nearby for a long time. The fraction of individuals with a preferred destination α is n α but we also contemplate a fraction n 0 of "uninformed" individuals, that have no a priori preference for any memorized destination. In our model, we use the convention that uniformed individuals have α i = 0 and h α i = 0 . Finally, individuals moving in the same direction can move further apart from each other, which is formally encoded by assuming that links between nodes decay with a constant rate λ. We note that this modeling framework allows to treat sociality, information and preference as independent factors in social animals. Therefore knowledgeable individuals can still display sociality and conformity to the group.
Network dynamics
We model the dynamics of link creation and destruction with stochastic Poissonian processes. At a rate η each individual can make a connection with another individual picked up randomly among all the individuals to which it is not connected. The connection will be established only if the individuals share the same internal dynamical state a i . The effective link creation rate, between two individuals i and j that are not linked, can be easily written down
where δ i,j stands for the Kronecker delta δ i,j = 1 if i = j and δ i,j = 0 otherwise. For all the other states this transition rate is identically 0. Moreover, existing links decay in time with a rate λ and thus:
Internal state dynamics
The upgrade of the internal state is a Poissonian process with rate ν. When an internal state update event occurs the individual has two possibilities.
If an individual is linked to another individual, it will change its internal state conforming to the state of the majority in its neighbourhood, that is the new internal state:
On the other hand, if an individual is not linked, it will pick up an internal state at random. More precisely, we assume that each individual has a preferred value of the internal variable, let us call it α i . In the case of an internal state update event, an unlinked individual will pick up a state according to the following probability distribution:
where h α i is a parameter that measures the intensity of the preference. The internal state update (after a transient time if not starting from an empty network) can only link two configurations that differ by the value of the internal variable of one unlinked node i. The transition probability is then:
Invariant measure
Given the above transition rates, we can write down the master equation and, applying detailed balance, we can derive the invariant measure (π) in terms of the stochastic variables of the system g ij and a i (see Supplementary Materials for the details). The invariant measure reads:
where Z is the normalization constant. Let N α a = ∑ j δ a j a δ α j α be the number of individuals that are in state a but would like to be in state α and let
the adimentional parameter that accounts for the effective creation of link in the network, thus measuring the sociality of the group, with standard mathematical manipulations (see Supplementary Materials) we can easily write the stationary state distribution in terms of the densities n = {n α a } as follow:
where
and W is the normalization constant. In the large population limit (N → ∞) this distribution peaks exponentially in N around the minima of F. The stationary points of F(n; z, h) satisfies the following system of equations: n α a = e h α δ aα +zn a n α (e h α − 1)e zn α + ∑ a e zn a (10) where n a = ∑ i n i a is the total density of individuals whose internal state is a (See Supplementary Materials for detailed calculation).
Therefore with a large number of individuals and in the stationary state of the system we are able to use Eq. (10) to analytically describe the fraction of individuals with a priori preference α that end up heading towards destination a.
This set of non-linear equations has many solutions in principle. Those corresponding to stationary states can be fully characterized in terms of the average network degree k (i.e. the average number of neighbours of individuals) that is a proxy for the school density. It can be shown that one measure of the network degree is k = z 1 − 1 q σ + z q where the quantity:
is a direct measure of the school efficiency and it takes values between σ = 1, when all individuals belong to a group that migrates towards the same destination; and σ = 0 when individuals distribute equally between different destinations. Hence the solution with high coordination (σ 1) also corresponds to high network densities k z. Among all the solutions of Eq. (10), those corresponding to minima of F(n; z, h) will determine the behaviour of the system, since they correspond to the values around which the stationary distribution shall peak.
Results
We shall analyse two cases 1) the case of a population without informed individuals, n 0 = 1, and 2) the case where a fraction n 1 = 1 − n 0 of the individuals have a preferred migratory destination, whereas the rest is not informed.
Migration without information
When no information is available in the group, the system reduces to an adaptive network model in which group coordination only depends on the rates at which links are created or destroyed [21, 22] .
Below a certain thresholdž only one local minimum exists which corresponds to a symmetric solution σ = 0 (Figure 2 a) ; there the network is sparse, k < 1, and the group does not migrate. Atž, a new bundle of q local minima appears at which σ > 0. There the network is dense, k > 1, and a fraction of the individuals comparable with N (called in graph theory giant component) is connected with one another and coordinated on the same destination choice.
The analysis also produces the full probability distribution of different states that allows ranking the solutions in terms of their probability (see Supplementary Materials). Betweenž andẑ both solutions coexist and individuals can migrate in a coordinated manner or not. Aboveẑ the only local minima are for σ > 0 while the sparse solution σ = 0 becomes unstable. There is an intermediate point z * below which the sparse solution is the most likely outcome whereas, above it, the high density solution will prevail.
Informed migration
In order to analyse the role of information in the model, we study the simplest possible case, with q destinations, a density of informed individual n 1 = 1 − n 0 and a preference h about a single destination.
The equation (10) again can be solved numerically to obtain prediction on schooling behaviour. Information has two main effects on the system Figure 2 : Critical group dynamic: school efficiency, σ as function of the social parameter z in (a) non informed group n 1 = 0 and (b) informed group n 1 = 0.05, h = 0.5. The dotted lines represent all the stable solutions of (10), the shadowed areas identify the coexistence region whereas the solid lines show the equilibrium solution. (Figure 2 b) . First, it breaks the symmetry between the q high density solutions found in the n 0 = 1 case, by selecting the solution with the preferred destination α = 1 as the most likely. The q − 1 solutions corresponding to migration toward other destinations remain stable, but are much less likely to be selected by the population.
Secondly, the coexistence region between high and low density solutions [ž,ẑ] is reduced in the case of informed migration ( Figure 2 ). In fact this region becomes smaller as the number of informed individuals increases ( Figure 3) .
Eventually, there exists a critical value of n 1 at which the region collapses into a point. This change in the behaviour of the system is equivalent to a second order phase transition in physics. For values of n 1 greater than this critical point the system has a smooth transition between low and high density states, as z increases, and a single solution is found. Moreover the coexistence region and the critical value change with h. The thick line in Figure 3 marks the point, in the coexistence region, where the two solutions are equally probable; on the right (left) of this line we expect to see the high (low) density solution.
The behaviour of the solution as the parameters h and n 1 = 1 − n 0 vary, at fixed z, is depicted in Figure 4 . For low values of z (Figure 4a ) we observe a smooth crossover from low to high density solutions as h and/or n 1 increase whereas when z is larger the system exhibits a sharp transition between the two solutions (Figure4b). The presence of a sharp transition with coexistence in a broad range of parameters is a robust feature of this model.
For more complicated settings using competing groups with different preferred migratory destinations, it can be shown that, for large z the population coordinates towards the migratory destination that provides the largest product n α h α (see Supplementary Materials). This quantity can be interpreted as the strength of the group's collective memory toward a given migration site, α.
This provides us with a vivid picture of how we expect the collective behaviour of the population to change when the parameters z, h and n 0 change. Adapting this picture to the observed behaviour of populations provides hints on the likely underlying causal effects. In brief, when z is large, i.e. for individuals with a marked pro-social behaviour, we expect ) is a schematic illustration of the hysteresis mechanism for a bluefin tuna population starting with high n 1 and h, then decreasing n 1 and h (overfishing of both preys and predators) and subsequently increasing h (increase of population of preys). abrupt transitions when either the density n α of individuals with a given preference, or the intensity h α of that preference varies in such a way as to cross the boundaries in the phase diagram (Figure 3) .
When both preference and information are decreased in the informed migration problem, abrupt transition from efficient group formation to collapse of migration efficiency are visible. We note that this hysteresis cycle is consistent with observed stock collapses of migratory fish populations [15] . When the migratory population is described using a social parameter z close to the critical point, then the interplay between the memory for a given destination, h, and the fraction of the individuals informed, n 1 about this destination can produce an abrupt transition in the migration of the species.
In the case of a school migrating in direction 1, a decrease of the value of h and n 1 over years e.g. due for example to overfishing of both individuals and prey in the migration site, can force the system to cross the critical line reaching eventually low values of both h and n 1 . When in this condition, an increase in the value of h, e.g. better habitat conditions or food availability, for those few vagrant fish that might still be present in the area cannot bring the system back to the original state because the system may not cross again the critical line. Thus the group may not migrate in direction 1 even though previous environmental conditions are re-established.
Discussion
We show that abrupt changes in migratory patterns of animals' groups can be caused by removal of knowledgeable individuals from the group or by decreasing preference of the individuals towards a particular migration site. Our results are consistent with previous models suggesting that a small number of informed individual can lead to large group migrations [23, 14] . Additionally we demonstrate that diminishing individual preference for a given migration site can preclude group formation and break the migration process.
The migration game
The migration process can be described as an emergent property of the population undertaking a group formation game: when the spatial density of fish is locally low, each individual moves independently, and the system is in a sparse network configuration with a value of z below the lower edge of the coexistence region. In this state uninformed individuals cannot migrate whereas informed individuals can undertake a solitary migration towards their preferred destination. Due to external stimuli (water temperature, local currents, topography, etc. ) the density may increase and so does the value of z, driving the system toward the coexistence region; in this region even though the local density of fish is high a sparse network configuration in which each fish moves independently is still stable but a stable dense network configuration also appears. When the system reaches the upper edge of this region, further increasing the density, the sparse network configuration becomes unstable while the dense network configuration prevails and the school starts a migration toward the preferred destination. On the other hand angchysteretic cycle is present in this system and when the local density of fish decreases in the school, z, decreases and the system is driven back to the coexistence region. A similar effect can be reproduced in the system by lowering the preference factor, h. The schooling configuration remains stable until the system reaches the lower edge of the coexistence region: at this point, fish stop schooling and the system switches back into the sparse configuration.
The group formation game described above can be repeated each year naturally driving changes in the preference term h, hence in the memory of migratory fish. Likewise changes in this or in the other terms of the model can occur when the migratory population is affected by external stimulus , e.g., overfishing, habitat degradation, demographic fluctuations. Such variations may then result in abrupt changes in the migratory patterns.
It is reasonable to assume the existence of trade-offs between the benefit of being in a school and the cost involved in both acquiring information from the environment and in pro-social traits [17] . Therefore, the assumption that the parameter of the system can be in the critical region may be seen as a consequence of evolutionary pressure. Indeed the critical zone is the most "economical" choice of parameters compatible with the benefits of being in school. When the system is in the critical region it can respond adaptively and rapidly even to mild changes in the environment [24] . In particular fluctuations in either the abundance of informed individuals or the memory they have of the migration site can induce a sudden shift to other concurrent migratory destinations.
Conflicting preferences
From the asymptotic analysis (Supplementary Materials) we demonstrate that, for large value of z, the group shall migrate toward the direction αfor which the product n α h α is maximal, whereas in the limit of small z, the sparse configuration is the only stable one. This suggest that our results might be extended to a? group with conflicting preferences. It is relevant to note that in our model all individuals have a social component. For example in groups with conflicting preferences our model suggests that, for some range of the parameters, an informed individual can follow the group and migrate toward a site different from his preferred destination. This approach makes our definition of leaders not only dependent on the amount of information stored but also on the social context in which they live. Therefore, the interaction between personal information and social effects is explicitly resolved in our model and we note it has been suggested to operate in living groups [10, 25] .
Collective memory and breakdown of social traditions
Breakdown of social traditions, due to selected fishing on older informed individuals, has been hypothesized to have contributed to stock collapses in several large commercially important fish populations [15, 13] .
Our sketch of the migration game suggests that social dynamics may lead to such collapses and that the integrity of migration pathways and spatial distributions of migratory predators might be particularly vulnerable to perturbations such as fishing or habitat degradation. Fishing out informed individuals and their prey can exacerbate the loss of collective memory up to the point where a migratory pathway is suddenly interrupted. Our model offers a simple quantitative explanatory framework for studying the breakdown of social traditions. We can assume that each year young individuals join the group: among them a fraction is able to gather information and remember a migratory route whereas the rest has a purely social behaviour. The "information-gathering-able" individuals behave as uninformed individuals (h = 0) but learn a new migratory route during the first migration(s). If the group does not succeed in starting migration, or migrates toward a different location, the young "information-gatheringable" individuals will not learn the traditional migration route of the group and the social traditions of the group will not be transmitted to the new generations. The lost of collective memory in the group will then force the system to cross the critical line and the migration toward the destination site will stop.
An example of prey-predator collapse and subsequent abrupt disappearance of migratory route is provided by Atlantic bluefin tuna, Thunnus thynnus, and its main prey, herring, Clupea harengus. During the 1950s-1970s both species were heavily exploited in the Norwegian and North Seas resulting in the disappearances of both species [26, 27, 28] . Since then, the herring populations in both regions have recovered to moderate-high levels [26, 27] , but bluefin tuna are still extremely rare and apparently have not migrated to these areas since the disappearance several decades ago [28] . These hysteretic dynamics are consistent with a fishing-induced removal of predators having preference for migration to these regions and a fishing induced decline in habitat quality which then leads to the collapse of group formation and a sudden change in migratory path (cf. Figure 4) . Our model may therefore be capable of identifying mechanisms of migration collapse and recovery.
A Master Equation and Invariant Measure
Let N be the number of individuals in the group and q the number of possible choices (directions).
For any finite N and q, we label the states of the system with ω = (G, a) where G is the N × N adjacency matrix of the system (i.e. (G) ij = g ij ∈ {0, 1}), and a = (a i ) is a vector whose i-th component is the values of the internal variable of i-th node. At any instant the state of the system is described by Ω(t) which can be equal to one of the states described above. Therefore stochastic dynamics of the system is described by a Master Equation for the probabilities:
where P(ω, t) = P(Ω(t) = ω); (A.2) and the ρ are the transition rates which correspond to the three dynamical processes described in Methods Section of the main paper. For clarity sake we describe them again here.
link creation With a rate η each node i can establish a link with another j node picked up randomly among the others. The link is established only if a i = a j This process can connect only two states ω and ω such that g hk = g hk ∀ (h, k) = (i, j), g ij = 0 and g ij = 1. The transition rate is clearly
link destruction Each link ha a destruction rate λ.
This process can connect only two states ω and ω such that g hk = g hk ∀ (h, k) = (i, j), g ij = 1 and g ij = 0. The transition rate is clearly
preference update Each node can update its internal state at a rate ν.
If the node is linked when an internal state upgrade event occurs, it will conform to its neighbourhood. This assumption is coherent with what is usually done in modelling group motion that is assuming that an individual tend to "follow" the its neighbours.
If, instead, the node is not linked it will undergo a random transition to a state a i ;the probability of picking up one direction over another encodes the amount of a priori information the individual has. Each individual has a direction preference α i . If α i = 0 then each direction has the same probability(1/q) of being chosen (no a priori information); if α i ∈ {1, ..., q} than the i-th individual as a higher probability of picking the direction α i over the others. The strength of the preferences h α does not vary among the individual that share the same direction preference but may be different from individuals preferring different directions.
Since the network dynamics allows only link creation between nodes that share the same internal state, at equilibrium, because of this upgrade rule, no change of internal state will be possible any more as long as a node is linked.
This kind of update, thus, can only link systems with network structure which differ by at most one by the direction of one node.
In particular,as soon as the system hits a state in which only nodes that share the same internal state are linked together, only transition upgrade of unlinked spins are allowed, that is, transition between two states: ω and ω which differ only for the value of internal variable of the i-Th node (i.e. a i = a i ). The transition is then easily written:
The main aspect in which we are interested is the equilibrium state. Since there are no unbalanced loops in the structure of the master equation, the equilibrium solution exists and it can be obtained by applying detailed balance (DB): Let us call
the invariant measure of the system. To obtain it we shall apply DB to a state with non empty network. In this case only the first two processes may occur and thus, using the same notation the previously, we get:
The invariant measure then reads:
where π(a) is the probability measure of ending in an empty network with an internal state vector a
A.0.1 the form of π(a)
Let us define S the vector of the values α i in equation (A.5). We can thus express the value of π(a) in term of π(S). Let's define s (i) in such a way that
Clearly S = s (0) and a = s (N) . The transition rate between s (i) and s (i+1) is just that of a spin flip from α i to a i that is: .10) and thus applying DB we get:
The complete invariant measure becomes:
where π(S) represents the probability for state characterized by an empty network and each of the internal states equal to the preferred state to occur. Nevertheless the quantity π(S)e − ∑ i h α i can be determined by normalization and then the invariant measure (A.12) can be written as:
where Z is the normalization constant (the partition function in the language of statistical physics).
A.1 The population distribution
In order to take the thermodynamic limit we need to obtain an expression in which the N is explicit. That is we need to infer from the invariant measure (A.13) an expression for the probability distribution function of the populations involved. Let's consider a partition of the entire population (i.e. the number of nodes) N into classes N = {N α a }, where N α a = |{n ∈ N|(a n = a) ∧ (α n = α)}|, that is the number of nodes that are in the state a while they would like to be in the state α with intensity h α = 0. Moreover we define a class of uninformed individuals N 0 a = |{n ∈ N|(a n = a) ∧ (α n = 0)}| where we used the shortcut notation to identify with α = 0 the absence of any preference. Obviously
of population is then induced by p(N) = π(Ω(N))
For sake of simplification we shall use the following notation: N a = ∑ α N α a + N 0 a which denotes the number of nodes in actual state a, N α = ∑ a N α a which denotes the number of nodes with preferred state α, N 0 = ∑ a N 0 a which denote the number of uninformed nodes . We assume that the N α , N 0 are known and fixed.
For each configuration of the internal variables, the equilibrium dynamics allows ∑ a 2 Na (Na −1) 2 different network configurations with non-zero probability. The weight of all network structures is the same for a given the number of links in a given preference class (since only networks with links between coordinate nodes carry non zero contribution). Calculating their contribution to p(N) reduces to counting how many different network structure are there with a given number of links i. The answer is trivially
(A.15)
A.1.1 Dynamics over the network contribution
To calculate the contribution of the dynamics over the network to p(N), we can notice that:
Thus the contribution of the dynamics over the network has a weight given by exp(∑ a,i h a N a a ) .
A.1.2 The complete p(N)
To have the whole distribution we just have to notice that there are exactly
configuration with the same weight and thus we can write
Where Z is the normalization constant. The measure is defined over the multisymplex defined by: .17) and
B Thermodynamic limit and equilibrium solution
Once we have a form for the p(N) we can expand in N and take the thermodynamic limit. Let us denote the densities with n α a = N α a N and consequently n a = ∑ α n α a and n α = ∑ a n α a . We want, first, to address the problem whether there is a function F(n; η λ , h), that plays the role played by the free energy in usual statistical physics, such that:
To do so, we expand p(N) in a large N limit, using Stirling approximation(log(N!) N log(N) − N, log(1 + x) x for small x and normalization :
We then obtain :
Thus in the thermodynamic limit the invariant measure will converge to a sum of Dirac delta measures centred in the global minimum (or minima) of the free energy (because of normalization all other minima will be exponentially depressed).
B.1 Minimization of Free Energy
We then have to minimize the Free Energy of the system:
subject to the constraints:
We introduce then Lagrange multiplier β α − 1 for the first constraints and β 0 − 1 the second one and impose FOC:
and thus n 0 a = e we can write n 0 = e β 0 Q (B.12) and
Equation (B.12) allows us to eliminate one Lagrangian multiplier:
Equation (B.13) instead allows us to eliminate the quantity
We then have also the normalization constraint:
We can then write the FOC for our system in the following way
λ n a
When we consider only systems where only one direction is preferred, some simplification can be made.
To ease the notation we shall write z = 2η λ , x = n 1 and y i − 1 = n i for i ∈ {2, .., q}.
In this case equation (B.17) take the simplified form:
with the conditions
and
Solving equation (C.4) with respect e x , calling Γ = PQ = n 0 + WQ we get:
and thus, plugging it in the first equation of (C.1), we obtain:
Plugging the previous result in (C.5), we get Q. On the other hand form equation 1 in (C.1) we obtain
plugging everything in equation (C.1) we obtain the following system of equations written in term of Γ :
q-1 times (C.8) From previous equation (C.8) we can infer the structure of the solutions. Both equations have the same shape:
where c is a constant to be determined auto-consistently. if c is negative the equation has only one negative (thus unphysical) solution, if c is greater than e −1 it has no solution otherwise it admits to solution which can be expressed in terms of Lambert's functions:
(C.10) and
where W 0 , W 1 represents the two real branches of Lambert's function. It is trivial to check x − < 1 whereas x − > 1 and that for small values of c x + > z and thus is to be discarded. In our case c is a complicate function of Γ but, as above, once Γ (and z) is fixed we know that x and y can take only two values x ± and y ± as defined above and thus we can label all the solutions using two integers α which counts the number of x in + state (which of course is either 0 or 1) and L + which counts the number of y in + state.
If we define, for notational ease:
it is easy to check that have the following hierarchy in the admissible range Γ ∈ [n 0 , 1]:
14) The normalization equation (C.2) will then become, given integers α and L + :
(C.15)
Its solutions will give the Γ auto-consistently.
Since the previous substitution is valid only when (C.6) is assumed we can rewrite the equation as:
C.1 Stability
When n α = 1 − n 0 all the values n α a = 0 for α > 1 because of the normalization constraints; the Lagrangian function, thus, becomes ( here
To check the stability and the nature of these stationary points we have to check the Hessian L of the Lagrangian restricted to the tangent space T to the constraints manifold in the stationary point.
The stationary point will be a (local minimum) if and only if:
In our case the constraint are linear; therefore the tangent space T is a 2q − 2 dimensional space and it can be easily seen to be spanned by the orthonormal base:
where i ∈ {1, .., 2q} and j ∈ {1, .., 2q + 2}. The projection operator then is given by the matrix
Any vector y of T can be expressed by a general vector v of R 2q as y = Mv. Equation (C.18) can be then expressed as:
Thus in order to check the stability of a stationary point in the constrained problem we can simply apply the usual Hessian criteria to the "effective Hessian
D Perturbative expansion of the solutions of FOC around
The free energy of the system may be written as:
where f, g are bounded functions of n(z).
For finite z we cannot say anything about the minimum, but from the structure of the free energy we can get the structure of the minimum in the limiting case when z → 0 and z → ∞.
When z = 0 the the minimum is obtained by minimizing f. It is easy to check that this solution correspond to the zeroth order of the perturbative expansion of the solutions of (B.17).
D.1 Zeroth order
Let us assume that n α a (z) is analytic around z = 0 (i.e.n α a (z) = ∑ kn α a,k z k for k > 0). The zeroth order value can be obtained directly substituting z with 0 in eq. (B.10). And, with some algebra we get:
thus leading to
D.2 First order
The first order of that expansion can be obtained easily deriving eq. (B.17) with respect to z then setting (z = 0). We have in particular:
The full equation thus reads:
For large n 0 , as it is natural to expect, this solution corresponds to the sparse network configuration. This is the only solution of eq. (B.17) at z = 0. Since the FOC are analytic for z → 0 at least in a neighbourhood ofz = 0 we can state that the solution obtained perturbatively is the only minimum of the free energy and that it corresponds to a sparse network configuration (indeed for z = 0 the network cannot grow at all).
E Asymptotic Expansion of the solutions of FOC for
z → ∞
In the case of z → ∞ case the minimum must correspond to a maximum of f(n). In this case we have q degenerate maxima n eq i corresponding to n i = 1 and n b = 0 ∀b = i.
In order to gain some insight on which of these solutions is the true minimum of the free energy for large but finite z we have to make and asymptotic expansion around z = ∞.
We proceed by steps expanding n a (z) in equation (B.17) for large z around the solution at z = ∞ n α = 1, n a = 0 for a = α.
If we assume that n a (z) has the following form around ∞:
Since the right hand member of equation (B.17) is o(e −z ) whereas, for a = α the left hand member of the equation is meromorphic, we immediately obtain thatn a (z) = 0.
Obtaining the non analytic contribution requires, instead, a harder work. We shall proceed by steps. We assume, in the following, thatn a (z) = ∑ k≥0na (k)z −k . 
E.1 Left hand member of equation (B.17)
In this case it is sufficient to keep items up to order e −z to obtain non trivial results. The FOC becomes then
and thus equating order by order, and using normalization constraints, we obtain:
In this case, at order e −z the equation is trivially satisfied because of normalization constraints; we need thus to keep also the terms of order e −2z . e −z + e −2z −zn α (0) +n α (0) −n α (1) + (n α (1) −n α (2)) z −1 = The solution can be obtain equating order by order and one gets:
n α (0) = − (q − 1) 1 + n α (e −h α − 1) + n 0 + n α − 1 + ∑ i =α e h i n i n α (1) = 0 (E.12) It can be easily checked that these solutions are consistent with the normalization constraint order by order.
E.4 Asymptotic expansion of n b a
We can plug the previous equation in equation (B.10) and obtain, after a little algebra, the asymptotic expansion for the n b a variables. We have to distinguish between seven cases. when 
E.5 Asymptotic expansion of the Free Energy
We can plug all the equation previously written in the expression of the free energy and, after some algebra obtain the following asymptotic formula for the free energy for z → ∞
(E.20) As the sub-leading term (the constant term) is enough to determine which is the global minimum. In fact the solution with the maximum n α h α prevail. In the case in which two or more direction have the same value of h i n i the solution with the bigger value of h i will prevail.
F Parameters of the model: physical interpretation
Our theoretical framework is a stylised representation of the migratory behaviour of fish populations. Nevertheless,the three parameters of the model have a clear interpretation in terms of realistic parameters.
For example, the value of η must have a dependence on the density of individuals; most of the real space models [1, 19] assume that individuals interact only with "close" individuals (e.g. closer than a certain radius) which is a reasonable description of the natural behaviour of schooling fishes; thus if the local density of individuals is too low the probability of being close enough to interact with one another is small and thus the link creation rate must also be small; on the contrary the higher the density, the higher the number of "close" individuals and the higher the creation rate must be. Moreover, social individuals (species) have developed specific social abilities which are encoded in their genetic make-up and thus a social fish is expected to be able to interact with other individuals of its species more effectively than a fish of a non social species: by the rules of our model, this means that at a given local density of individuals the social species will have a significantly higher link creation rate and lower link destruction rate and thus a higher value of z. A variation of local density may induce even significant variation of η and therefore of z. The range of these variations,however , may be seen as a genetically determined quantity.
The interpretation of the other parameters is easier, the value of n i is the relative proportion of individuals in the population that possesses information about destination i; the value of h i may be considered as a parameter that implicitly measures the memory of each individual about the route towards a given feeding site, and/or about its quality (quantity of prey, water temperature, water quality etc.).
